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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Richard Ernest Andersen appeals from the restitution order associated 
with his convictions for battery on a police officer, malicious injury to property 
(misdemeanor), and battery (misdemeanor).                      .   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
   
 According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the facts underlying 
Andersen’s convictions are as follows: 
The attached police report indicates that on September 23, 2014, 
police responded to a fight situation.  Dispatch advised that Robert 
Smith had walked up to some neighoring [sic] occupants to ask 
them to keep the noise down.  When he did, a male spit on him.  
While in route, it was advised that Richard Andersen was out of 
control and acting strange.  Upon arrival, Richard Andersen was in 
the driveway.  He had obviously urinated himself, as his crotch area 
was wet.  He also had blood all over his mouth.  Mr. Andersen was 
jumping up and down as officers ordered him to sit down.  Mr. 
Andersen then starting aggressing Corporal Markle. Officer 
Cromwell approached Mr. Andersen and grabbed his left arm.  Mr. 
Andersen attempted to pull away.  Officer Cromwell then used a 
[sic] arm-bar takedown technique in order to take him to the 
ground.  Once on the ground, Mr. Andersen kicked Officer 
Cromwell on two (2) occasions.  As a result, Officer Cromwell 
delivered knee strikes to Mr. Andersen's thigh area in attempt to 
stop him. Mr. Andersen's left wrist was placed in handcuffs, while 
keeping his right arm underneath him.  He was ordered to place his 
right arm behind his back, but refused and began kicking around 
and moving around on the ground.  Concerned that he might have 
a weapon, Officer Cromwell delivered several more knee strikes to 
his thigh.  Mr. Andersen then complied and was able to be placed 
in handcuffs.  After doing this, Mr. Andersen was able to move to 
his side and kick Officer Cromwell in the left leg. 
 
Upon speaking with Devian Stapleton and Victor Kennedy, Mr. 
Stapleton advised that he lived at the address and had several 
people over.  He advised that he had never met Mr. Andersen 
before.  Mr. Andersen showed up at his house and informed 
everyone that he had just taken Acid.  Mr. Andersen then 
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proceeded to break items in Mr. Stapleton's kitchen, to include 
several dishes and glasses, as well as throwing items on the floor. 
Mr. Stapleton then began fighting with Mr. Andersen, stating this 
was how Mr. Andersen got the bloody lip.  Mr. Andersen then spit 
blood on Mr. Stapleton.  Mr. Stapleton said that his neighbor, 
Robert Smith, came over.  When he did, Mr. Andersen spit blood in 
Mr. Smith's face. 
 
(PSI, p.3.) 
 The state charged Andersen with battery on a police officer, malicious 
injury to property (misdemeanor), and two counts of misdemeanor battery.  (R., 
pp.116-123.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Andersen pled guilty to all but one 
count of misdemeanor battery.  (R., p.103.)  The district court sentenced 
Andersen to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for battery on a 
police officer, all suspended, and placed him on probation for five years.  (R., 
pp.116-123.)  The court sentenced Andersen to 17 days of jail on each of the two 
misdemeanors.  (Id.)   
 The state filed a Motion for Restitution, requesting $53,715.51 for losses 
incurred by the City of Boise and $70.70 to the Boise City Police Department.  
(R., pp.124-132.)  At the restitution hearing, the only witness was Jason Carrier, 
a senior claims adjuster for Intermountain Claims, “a third-party administrator for 
the City of Boise for the workers’ compensation as a self-insured employer under 
the state of Idaho.”   (Tr., p.2, Ls.10-23.)  During the hearing, the court admitted 
State’s Exhibit 1, an itemization verified by Mr. Carrier as consisting of “all of the 
documentation and all the reimbursements that were actually made by the 
insurance company and/or the City of Boise to providers.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-10.)  
After Mr. Carrier testified, the state requested the court order restitution in the 
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amount set forth in State’s Exhibit 1, which reduced the amount of restitution to 
$50,705.91.  (Tr., p.56, Ls.16-21; St. Ex. 1, p.3.)  Andersen’s counsel argued that 
Andersen should not be ordered to pay such a high amount of restitution 
because he was unlikely to have the ability to pay it due to his lack of education 
and work experience, explaining, “[h]e will be financially ruined by this.”  (Tr., 
p.61, L.2 – p.62, L.12.)   
 After taking the matter under advisement (Tr., p.66, Ls.19-20), the district 
court issued a “Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Restitution” (R., pp.142-
150), and “Order for Restitution and Judgment” (R., pp.151-152), ordering 
Andersen to pay $50,705.91 in restitution, while “fully aware it is unlikely that 
Andersen will ever pay the restitution in full” (R., p.149).  Andersen filed a timely 
















 Andersen states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it ordered Mr. Andersen to pay 
$50,705.91 in restitution to the Boise City Attorney’s Office for 
Officer Cromwell’s injury? 
   
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Has Andersen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 






Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Ordering Him To Pay $50,705.91 In Restitution 
 
A. Introduction 
 Andersen contends that the district court abused its discretion under I.C. § 
19-5304(7)1 by ordering him to pay $50,705.91 in restitution despite his current 
and future earning ability.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  The record however, 
reflects that, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(7), the district court properly considered 
Andersen’s current and future earning ability and exercised sound discretion in 
determining the amount of restitution.   
 
B. Standard Of Review  
 
 The decision whether to order restitution is committed to the trial court's 
discretion, and the trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be 
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.  State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 
692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering Andersen To 
Pay $50,705.91 In Restitution  
 
 Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court “shall” order 
restitution for economic loss actually suffered by the victim.  I.C. § 19-5304(2). 
                                            
1  I.C. § 19-5304(7) reads: 
 
 The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of 
such restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the 
victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning 
ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.  
The immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of 
itself, a reason to not order restitution. 
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Nevertheless, the court may decline to order restitution or order less than full 
restitution after considering other factors, including “the financial resources, 
needs, and earning ability of the defendant.”  I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7).  While a 
district court is required to consider these factors, inability to pay neither 
precludes nor limits a restitution award; rather, ability to pay is only one factor for 
a court’s consideration when it makes a discretionary restitution determination.  
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State 
v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003)).  In addition, 
“[t]he immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of 
itself, a reason to not order restitution.”  I.C. § 19-5304(7). 
 Andersen does not argue that the district court failed to consider his ability 
to pay restitution, nor does he highlight any part of the record that would indicate 
as much.2  Instead, he disagrees with the district court’s decision after 
considering his ability to pay.  Specifically, Andersen contends the court abused 
its discretion in ordering restitution because he has shown a current and future 
inability to pay restitution based on the following factors gleaned from the 
Presentence Report:  (1) he is a 21-year-old high school drop-out who does not 
                                            
2  Even if Andersen is contending the district court failed to consider his ability to 
pay, his argument fails.  In Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379-380, 93 P.3d at 710-711, the 
defendant challenged a restitution order where, at the restitution hearing, the 
district court did not specifically state that it had considered the defendant’s 
ability to pay.  Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379-380, 93 P.3d at 710-711.  This ability was 
referenced only in Olpin’s PSI.  Id. at 380.  Nonetheless, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals said it was not convinced that the district court failed to adequately 
consider Olpin’s ability to pay restitution, and the restitution order was affirmed. 
 Id.  Here, unlike in Olpin, the district court expressly recognized the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-5304(7), including Andersen’s ability to pay.  (R., p.149; 




have a GED, and who had to have an Individual Education Plan in school 
because he was “slow,” (2) he has had only one job in his life, and that lasted 
seven days, and (3) he lives in his parent’s home with his girlfriend and their (he 
and his girlfriend’s) young daughter.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  Anderson 
concludes, “It is all but impossible for someone in [his] position to obtain the 
education level and earning capacity needed to pay over $50,000 in restitution.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Andersen’s argument fails. 
 In State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 768 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1989), Bybee 
was convicted of grand theft, and was ultimately ordered to pay over 1.5 million 
dollars in restitution.  Bybee, 115 Idaho at 542, 768 P.2d at 805.  Bybee argued 
that the amount was excessive given his incarceration, age, financial needs and 
inability to pay.  Id. at 543.   The Idaho Court of Appeals, however, found no 
abuse of discretion: 
     Given the magnitude of the amounts involved here, we 
believe it unlikely that Bybee will ever meet the full amount of 
restitution ordered.  But, in the event Bybee is able to obtain some 
assets, the victims should have ready access to the assets for 
satisfaction of their losses.  The order of restitution will provide the 
essential avenue of relief to the victims.  The order may be 
recorded as a judgment and the victims may execute as provided 
by law for civil judgments.  I.C. § 19-5305.   
 
 If the order required Bybee to make installment payments or 
if had set a deadline for paying restitution, we would be inclined to 
vacate the order.  As it now stands, however, the order simply gives 
the victims the present ability to obtain a judgment.  We see nothing 






 Here, similar to the situation in Bybee, and in obvious reference to I.C. § 
19-5304(7), the district court realized it was unlikely that the full amount of 
restitution would ever be paid, explaining: 
As an exercise of discretion, the Court does not determine an order 
of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable.  For that 
reason, the Court will order restitution as requested.  In so doing, 
the Court is fully aware it is unlikely that Andersen will ever pay the 
restitution in full.  At the same time, the Court also considered and 
hopes that Andersen’s future ability to pay may improve. 
 
(R., p.149.)  Although the district court did not expressly state that its restitution 
order would do so, as in Bybee, the order gave “the victims the present ability to 
obtain a judgment.”  See Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 768 P.2d at 806.3    
 Andersen, like Bybee, may never have the financial ability to fully repay 
the victims for his crimes.  That fact, standing alone, does not show an abuse of 
discretion.  Further, he could potentially obtain money by inheritance or gifts from 
friends and relatives.  The victims of Andersen’s crimes should have access to 
any assets that Andersen might come across.  The fact that the Andersen 
disagrees with the district court’s decision does not amount to an abuse of 
discretion.   
 
                                            
3  As was true in Bybee, the district court here did not order a payment deadline 
or installment payments on the restitution amount.  See Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 





 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order of restitution.   
 DATED this 6th day of September, 2016. 
 
        
 /s/ John C. McKinney_______________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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